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Summary
This paper studies the investment performance of pension funds with a focus on their
ability in implementing their intended investment strategy. We use a sample of Dutch
industry-wide pension funds, which are obliged by law to report their investment per-
formance according to the so-called z-score. The z-score is a risk-adjusted performance
measure where the benchmarks are chosen a priori preventing manipulation in the score
calculation. We nd that pension funds as a group cannot beat their self-selected bench-
marks and show no performance persistence. It reects that pension funds on average do
not add value in implementing their investment strategy. Cross-sectionally, it turns out
that large funds are better able to beat their benchmarks persistently than small funds.
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1 Introduction
The aggregated market value of Dutch pension fund portfolios is enormous. At the end of
year 2006 the total asset size of Dutch pension funds was around e691 billion, while the
assets from other sources, managed by collective investment schemes such as mutual funds
and hedge funds, are only about e117 billion.1 Most of these pension assets are associated
to the so-called "mandatory industry-wide pension funds" (e470 billion), which manage the
pension savings for the majority of Dutch employees. The sheer size of this category of pension
funds and their signicant role in providing retirement income warrant a careful investigation
of the performance of their investment portfolios.
In the Netherlands a mandatory industry-wide pension fund is a multi-sponsor pension
plan that provides dened benet pension services to all employees of the companies aliated
to a particular industry. Employees of these companies are obliged to participate in these
schemes. The mandatory feature of these plans leads to a legal requirement that pension
funds should report their investment performance in terms of a so-called z-score, a risk-
adjusted measure of their investment returns. If a fund fails a performance test based on this
z-score, it loses its mandatory status. Individual participating companies can then leave the
fund and either join another pension fund or establish their own fund.
In this paper, we use a unique data set of z-score observations to provide a cross-sectional
and longitudinal description of the investment performance of Dutch mandatory industry-
wide pension funds. Our study adds to the current literature on pension fund performance.
It provides another piece of evidence that pension funds do not add value in implementing
investment strategies with respect to the indicated benchmarks. Our study also shows the
variation in performance across funds of dierent sizes, revealing that big funds persistently
outperform small funds. This nding corroborates the ongoing consolidation in the pension
fund sector.
A pension fund portfolio consists of various asset classes, and the study of its investment
performance can be performed at the level of both an individual asset class portfolio and the
level of the overall fund portfolio. Previous empirical studies focus on the asset class level
1According to statistics on the website of the Dutch central bank (DNB): www.dnb.nl.
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to investigate the ability of individual asset managers. This type of performance evaluation
can aid pension fund trustees in their decisions of hiring and ring asset managers. From
the perspective of pension fund participants, however, the overall investment performance of
the fund is more important than the performance of an individual asset class. For example,
it is the overall performance that will inuence the contributions they have to pay and the
benets they receive after retirement. Our study addresses the question whether pension
funds outperform their benchmarks. The lack of empirical studies pension fund investment
performance is related to the fact that there is little detailed information available on the asset
allocations and the returns of individual components of the investment portfolio. The Dutch
sample used in our study overcomes this problem, and provides a risk-adjusted measurement
that accounts for fund- and period- specic asset allocations and performance.
The total investment return of a pension fund portfolio is in general determined by the
strategic asset allocation and the implementation of this allocation. The strategic allocation
is typically set by the trustees with the help of consultants and investment advisers. The
implementation of the strategic portfolio is delegated to internal or external asset managers
with dierent specializations.2 The quality of the implementation is determined by the dele-
gation and the monitoring of the investment. Our paper focuses on the second role of trustees
in their delegation and monitoring tasks. The success of the investment implementation is
measured by the fund's overall portfolio performance in excess of an a priori agreed-upon
benchmark portfolio.
Compared with retail investors, pension funds are more resourceful in carrying out an
investment strategy. They can receive extensive help from advisors and consultants, gain
valuable information before making the decisions, and can establish desired procedures to
monitor the investment process. We would expect that pension fund trustees are able to
select and recruit a superior group of internal and/or external asset managers and establish
eective investment management procedures to encourage their asset managers to beat the
pre-agreed benchmarks. A typical investment mandate awarded by a pension fund often
2A new trend is that an external investment rm acts as a duciary asset manager, who structures and
monitors the total investment process from strategic asset allocation to individual asset manager selection.
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has a contract life of two or more years.3 The inconvenience of moving a large amount of
pension assets across dierent asset managers or asset categories may also predict some type
of performance persistence. However, our study nds that over our sample period pension
funds do not outperform their benchmarks on average and show no performance persistence.
We do nd that large funds are able to persistently outperform their smaller peers. This
indicates that pension funds may revalue their eorts in active asset management.
This paper is organized as follows, In Section 2 we describe some previous studies on
pension fund investment performance. Section 3 provides some background on the invest-
ment processes at Dutch pension funds. Section 4 introduces the z-score and Section 5 the
associated data. The results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
In this part we make an overview of the major papers on pension fund performance evalu-
ation. Both Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1992) and Coggin, Fabozzi & Rahman (1993)
look at the equity portfolios of US pension funds. The rst paper takes a sample, as large as
it could be, to examine the double-agency structure and its relation with underperformance.
The second paper makes a random selection of equity pension funds to investigate the ability
of fund managers. Busse, Goyal & Wahal (2006) extend to xed income portfolio and use
a larger and recent dataset to estimate the abnormal returns. Tonks (2005) studies the UK
samples and investigates the ability of investment houses rather than individual fund man-
agers in managing pension assets. Bauer, Frehen, Lum & Otten (2007) study the aggregate
equity portfolio at the fund level, and focus on the comparison with the equity portfolio in
mutual funds. Brinson, Hood & Beebower (1986) and Ippolito & Turner (1987) pioneered the
performance evaluation at the overall fund level, and they both use a benchmark portfolio in-
cluding at most three asset classes, which is no longer proper for the current complex pension
portfolio. Blake, Lehmann & Timmermann (1999) study the UK pension funds and focus on
the return attribution to strategic asset allocation and managerial skills. The conclusions on
3Although in principal pension fund trustees can re the asset managers within a short notice such as one
day.
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outperformance from pervious studies are mixed and hard to compare, because they focus
on dierent sampling period and sampling region, use dierent benchmarks, and dier in fee
consideration and unit of observation such as asset managers or investment houses.
Lakonishok et al. (1992) investigate the performance of 769 US equity pension fund portfo-
lios for the period 1983Q1 through 1989Q4. Using quarterly gross return (before management
fees) they nd on average the equity portfolios under perform S&P 500, and conclude that
active management does not add value. They propose the reason for the underperformance
is the cost of double-agency structure existing in the pension fund industry where the invest-
ment is delegated from corporate management to corporate treasurer and then to portfolio
managers. As persistence is concerned, the equity portfolio as a whole does not show any
performance persistence for a one-year horizon. This result holds for the growth and the yield
portfolio, but the value portfolio shows some persistence.
Coggin et al. (1993) shed light directly on the performance of individual asset managers for
pension funds. They study the investment performance of US equity pension fund portfolios
by randomly sampling 71 managers for the period January 1983 through December 1990.
They distinguish monthly returns attributed to managers' stock selection and timing ability.
By using both a general equity market index and a style-specic index, they nd the equity
asset managers for pension funds on average have positive selection ability but negative timing
ability. They do not consider fees.
In addition to the equity portfolios, Busse et al. (2006) extends the analysis to other
asset classes including 1,683 xed income portfolios and 1,196 international equity portfolios
held by the US pension funds over the period of 1991-2004. Using quarterly returns, they
nd a positive abnormal return after adjusting for the relevant risk factors for all three asset
classes, even after controlling for costs. As persistence is concerned, only winner portfolios
show performance persistence for a one-year horizon.
Rather than looking at the individual asset managers and their portfolios, Tonks (2005)
turns his attention to fund management houses for the UK pension funds. His data are
quarterly returns on the equity portfolios of 2,175 U.K. pension funds managed by 191 fund
management houses from 1983Q1 to 1997Q4. Using a variety of risk adjustment, such as single
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factor Capital Asset Pricing Model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and a Carhart four-
factor model, and averaging the abnormal returns of all portfolios under one management
house, he nds a positive abnormal return and persistent performance of fund management
houses over a one-year horizon. His results do not take costs into account.
In addition to the performance evaluation at the portfolio level and fund management
house level, Bauer et al. (2007) study the performance of the aggregate equity portfolio for
the US pension funds (including 716 Dened Benet and 238 Dened Contribution plans)
between 1992 and 2004 at the fund level. Deducting the gross annual returns by the returns
to fund-specic benchmark and the costs, they nd close-to-benchmark performance. This
result also holds when the net returns are adjusted by the Fama-French risk factors. They
argue that this is because pension funds are less exposed to agency costs than mutual funds
for their monitoring capacity and negotiation power. They detect no persistence of the equity
portfolios at the fund level for one year horizon.
Studies on the overall pension fund portfolio performance are even scarcer. Among the
earliest is Brinson et al. (1986). They study 91 large US pension funds over a sample period
of 1974-1983. Attributing returns to investment policy returns and active returns due to
market timing and security selection, they document negative active returns, meaning under-
performance with respect to the benchmark portfolio which includes only coarse categories of
stocks, bonds and cash. Our paper in essence is similar to this paper in that our data separate
active returns from policy returns, and the policy returns are represented by the benchmark
return which is more accurate with a ner asset classication to reect the current complex
investment practice.
Rather than using a fund-specic benchmark portfolio, Ippolito & Turner (1987) use the
same benchmark indices such as S&P500 for all pension funds. Based on the net-of-fee returns
of 1,526 US pension funds they nd that the investment performance is very sensitive to the
choice of benchmark whether it is a stock index or a bond-stock mix index. They also nd
that larger pension funds outperformed smaller funds substantially. Their results are not very
informative for the current practice. Their choice of a broad stock or a stock-bond mix index
as a benchmark is not appropriate in the current performance evaluation of pension funds,
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as the current pension fund investment is no longer limited to general stocks or bonds as in
the paper's sample period back to 1977-1983, but is much more complicated in multiple asset
classes and styles.
A more recent paper on the pension fund performance is on the UK sample by Blake
et al. (1999). They investigate the monthly return of the overall pension portfolios of over
300 UK pension funds for the period of 1986-1994. Besides documenting underperformance
with respect to the benchmark portfolio, their paper has a focus on decomposing the returns
into a component attributed to strategic asset allocation and a component attributed to
management skills. They adjust the raw returns with a benchmark portfolio where the weight
to each asset class is either the time-average of realized allocation or an estimated weight by
associating it to time. In addition, they apply the same external indices for all pension funds
regardless of the dierence of investment style within a certain asset class.
Concluding the previous papers we nd there are two ways to construct a benchmark
portfolio in computing abnormal returns. One way is using risk factors (such as a equity
market index, a bond index or even detailed size factor, distress factor, etc.) for each asset
class and estimate the loading on these factors, such as Coggin et al. (1993), Tonks (2005),
and Busse et al. (2006). The benchmark portfolio is then composed by the loadings and the
returns to the risk factors. This approach can be used when there is a large dataset and
a proper estimation can be made. A second way is to use the holding information or asset
allocation of a portfolio, such as Brinson et al. (1986), Ippolito & Turner (1987), and Blake
et al. (1999). The benchmark portfolio is composed of the weighting and the index returns
to respective asset classes. This approach is more accurate in accounting for the risks but
requires holding information.
Our study distinguishes itself from most of the previous studies in three major aspects.
Firstly, we focus on the multi-asset pension fund portfolio rather than a delegated portfolio
in some asset class. This overall portfolio serves one pension plan, so its performance is
highly relevant to plan sponsors and beneciaries. Secondly, the data we use in this study
provides the returns after accounting for a holding-based benchmark. Such a benchmark is
more appropriate for a multi-asset portfolio than a benchmark based on some stylized risk
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factors. Thirdly, in the choice of a benchmark portfolio, our data improves in two aspects
compared to that used in Blake et al. (1999). Firstly the precise fund-specic and period-
specic weights for each asset class are used in the benchmark portfolio. Secondly the indices
for the benchmark portfolio are also fund-specic. For example, some fund may use S&P500
for an equity allocation, while some other fund may use a MSCI index. Therefore we have
the excess return that is appropriately adjusted by the fund-specic benchmark portfolio, and
it represents the value added by any deviation from the benchmark portfolio, due to either
stock selection or marketing timing strategy of the selected group of asset managers.
3 Investment process and performance
Before we address the performance, we provide a brief description of the investment process
of a dened benet Dutch pension fund. Although this description is motivated by the
Dutch case, it is not very dierent from general procedures. In brief, fund trustees typically
determine the investment policy with the help of consultants. The execution of this policy is
delegated to internal and/or external asset managers selected by trustees.
The investment policy is often motivated by an Asset Liability Management (ALM) study,
which is an integral risk management study of the fund, taking into account the short-term
and long-term objectives of the fund. The investment policy is represented by a strategic asset
allocation. This is a portfolio based on the fund's (subjective) view of expected returns and
risks of each asset class and an estimation of the fund's liabilities from a long-term perspective.
The strategic asset allocation is often reviewed every 3 or 5 years to reect major changes in
the underlying assumptions regarding the assets and the liabilities. From the strategic asset
allocation trustees dene an investment plan that can be implemented by asset managers,
often on an annual basis. This plan reects a shorter term view on the risk-return prole of
each asset class and sometimes indicates the ambition to exploit tactical allocation skills. The
investment plan typically consists of weights to individual asset classes that may dier from
the strategic weights set in the ALM study. According to the annual investment plan, trustees
assign mandates for each asset class to a selected group of asset managers.4 These managers
4There is a trend that trustees delegate this manager selection job to a duciary asset manager in order to
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can be either in-house or external, one or multiple, of passive or active style. The reason for
delegation is motivated by the perceived expertise of an asset manager in a particular asset
class. Other reasons can be economies-of-scale in trading and record keeping (Sharpe (1981)).
The performance of asset managers is monitored at a regular frequency.
The investment process reveals that investment returns are generated from three sources.
One is from the strategic asset allocation, computed from the allocation and the related index
return. The second source is from executing the annual investment plan, computed from the
weights set in the investment plan and the index return. This part of the returns measures the
added value from over- or under-weighing the strategic allocation, reecting the timing skills
of trustees when they draw up the investment plan. The last source comes from the actual
execution of the investment plan delegated to a group of asset managers, computed from the
actual weights and realized returns. It reects the timing and selection skills of the asset
managers as a group. Good (1984) and Brinson et al. (1986) have a similar return attribution
except that they further distinguish the returns from timing and selection skills. This paper
focuses on the returns from the third source, which reect the quality of implementing the
annual investment plan.
To obtain the dierence between the actual returns and the returns attainable from strict
adherence to an annual investment plan, a benchmark portfolio needs to be dened that
represents the annual investment plan. This benchmark portfolio is a hypothetical portfolio,
which is "structurally identical to the investment strategy without whatever active manage-
ment takes place" as dened in Logue & Rader (1998) (p168) or a "passive mix with the same
style" as in Sharpe (1992). Our performance measure denes such a benchmark portfolio.
An example can be found in Table 1. The benchmark portfolio has a twofold purpose. First,
the index for each component portfolio is used by trustees to evaluate the performance of
individual asset managers for a particular asset class. Second, the overall return from the
benchmark portfolio serves as a return target. In our study we use the benchmark portfolio
in the context of the second purpose to evaluate the quality of investment implementations
by asset managers.
avoid contacts with too many asset managers.
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Table 1: An example of a benchmark portfolio
This is a reproduction of a benchmark portfolio. It species the weighting and the indices
used for dierent investment styles. The range species the bound within which an active
asset manager must control the allocation. Source: 2006 annual report of the Agriculture and
Food Supply Pension Fund, which can be found via www.iqinfo.com.
Assets Weight Range Index
Fixed income 75% 65%-85%
Governments 70% 60%-80% Citigroup Gov Bond Index
Corporates 15% 10%-20% Citigroup non-EGBI EMU index
Private Loans 15% 10%-20% Customized Private Loan Index
Equity 15% 5%-25%
Europe 40% 30%-50% MSCI Europe
USA 20% 10%-30% MSCI North America
Pacic 15% 5%-25% MSCI Pacic
EM Global 25% 15%-35% MSCI EM Global
Real estate 5,0% 0%-10%
Residential 50% 25%-75% ROZ- IPD Woningen
Shops 50% 25%-75% ROZ- IPD Winkels
Alternatives 5,0% 0%-10%
Commodities 50% 0%-100% DJ-AIG Commoditie Index
Hedge Fund 50% 0%-100% Euro 7-day Libid
4 The performance measure: z-score
This section introduces the performance measure we use in this paper. Since 1998 every
Dutch mandatory industry-wide pension funds must compute a so-called z-score to reect
their investment performance. The z-score is the dierence between the actual return and
the return on a predened benchmark portfolio, net of expenses, and normalized by the
riskiness of the portfolio, as in the following equation:
zi;t =
(Rp;i;t   cp;i;t)  (Rb;i;t   cb;i;t)
Ei;t
where Rp;i;t and cp;i;t are the gross investment return and internal investment cost of pension
fund i at time t respectively. The internal investment cost also includes the fees paid to the
external asset managers and investment related custodian and administrative cost. Rb;i;t is
the fund i's benchmark portfolio return using market indices in the respective asset categories
at time t. See Table 1 for an example. cb;i;t is the associated investment cost of the benchmark
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portfolio which depends on the percentage of equity investment in the portfolio.5 The bench-
mark portfolio is determined by trustees at the beginning of each year and xed for one year.
Specically, the weights and the index for various asset classes in the benchmark portfolio
are dened a priori. In addition the index should represent the asset class, be investable and
objectively measurable.6 Thus the benchmark return represents the return that an individual
investor can obtain if he invests in the benchmark portfolio, and the dierence between the
realized return and the benchmark return reects the excess return that a pension fund can
earn by selecting the right internal or external asset managers. The pre-selected benchmark
portfolio also excludes the possibility of manipulation in calculating the z-score.
To enable the comparison across pension funds with dierent investment strategies, the
excess returns are scaled by the riskiness of the asset mix in the benchmark portfolio (Ei;t).
The asset mix for this purpose contains two major categories: equity and xed income (in-
cluding cash). The risk percentages assigned to the equity and xed income investment are
xed by law at 2:6% and 0:6% respectively.7 For example, if a fund has an asset mix of 60%
equity and 40% xed income, then Ei;t = 0:62:6%+0:40:6% = 1:8%. The reported z-score
is audited by external accountants.
The way the z-score is constructed reveals that it is not a measure to evaluate the eec-
tiveness of the investment plan, but a measure of the quality of implementing the investment
plan. The benchmark used in the calculation reects the investment plan for a particular fund
and a particular period. Therefore the z-score accurately shows the fund's ability in beating
their own benchmarks. A positive (negative) z-score means that the fund has successfully
implemented (failed to implement) its investment plan. This success (failure) is attributed to
a fund's skill in selecting and monitoring its asset managers. A high (low) z-score reects the
relatively good (poor) ability of the fund in executing its investment plan.
The creation of the z-score is to have a standardized normal distribution of the returns
of all funds so that the regulator can judge whether a fund's investment performance falls
5This cost is presented in Bpf (2000), and range from 0.10% to 0.22%. It varies to the equity proportion of
the pension portfolio.
6See Article 5.3 in Bpf (2000).
7According to Bpf (2000), the riskiness of equity and xed income investment is set at 2.6% and 0.6%,
which is said to be the excess returns of the respective asset category over the past few years at the time of
law enaction.
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to the lower 10% of the distribution. If a fund falls to the 10% percentile, it is regarded as
not delivering a satisfactory investment performance, then the participating companies are
no longer obliged to join this fund, and they have the option to leave the fund to join another
pension fund or establish their own. 8
We use the z-score to examine the quality of investment implementation by pension funds
over time and cross sectionally. There are some concerns for this measurement and we show
that they do not pose a serious obstacle to its use for our purpose.
A rst concern is that the benchmark portfolio is a static benchmark, in which the weight-
ing of dierent asset style are xed for one year. As a result, the intertemporal changes in
the investment plan during the year cannot be captured by the benchmark portfolio used in
the z-score calculation, but do change the return of the actual benchmark portfolio. This
can hamper a fair evaluation of the implementation quality, because part of the deviations is
due to the change of the benchmark portfolio and has nothing to do with the implementa-
tion ability of the selected asset managers. We believe the concern over a static benchmark
portfolio is more of a conceptual problem rather than a practical one due to the following
practices. Firstly, xed weighting is a general rule, but the benchmark portfolio is allowed
to be changed once when there is a considerable change in the liability structure or the old
investment plan is obviously no longer appropriate for the fund.9 Secondly, changing the
investment plan during the year is more of a practice per Jan 1, 2007 when the regulation on
nancial assessment is implemented, which requires the investment plan to match the market
value of liabilities. Thus during our sample period we do not expect material changes in the
investment plan during the year. Therefore the concern of a static benchmark portfolio lacks
a practical relevance in our performance evaluation.
A second concern is the risk adjustment in the denominator of the z-score, where the
riskiness only considers the asset categories of equity and xed income investments and the
8A statistical test, called performance test, is used to support this decision. Base on the central limit
theorem, the test statistic is calculated as P5 year = (
P5
t=1 Zi;t)=
p
5, following a normal distribution. The
critical value of the test is -1.28, which corresponds to a condence level of 90% for a standardized normal
distribution. If the test statistic is less than -1.28, a sponsor can choose to re the trustees by opting out of
this industry-wide pension fund.
9See Article 5.4 in Bpf(2000). As of November 1, 2007 funds are allowed to adjust their norm portfolio
twice a year. In addition, some funds, such as Pension fund Vervoer, use a oating benchmark moving with
portfolio development.
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riskiness are xed at a certain value. The ignorance of the real estate category might be a
potential issue for the risk adjustment. However, the z-score conducts the risk adjustment in
two levels. In addition to the risk adjustment in the denominator, the benchmark portfolio
in the numerator adjusts the risk in real estates by using a very ne classication as shown in
the example in Table 1. Moreover, the real estate investment is only a minority class (around
12%) of the total investment. Hence we believe the ignorance of the real estate class in the
denominator does not distort much the distribution of the current z-scores among pension
funds. Another concern is the moral hazard issue arising from the xed values of 2.6 and 0.6
as the riskiness of the equity and xed income investments, where pension funds can take
advantage in calculating their scores. If a fund takes more risks than what is assumed in the
benchmark, its z-score can be inated. However, this only happens in the up market. The
opposite happens in the down market. As our sample period covers both up and down market
conditions, a higher risk taking won't give an advantage in the z-score calculation, unless the
fund can time the market by taking a higher risk in the up market, and a lower risk in the
down market. We also examine the correlation between the z-score and the asset mix in our
sample and nd it is very low and not statistically signicant. This further suggests that the
z-score has fully adjusted the risk brought by the asset mix.
5 Data
We use the publications of the Dutch industry-wide pension fund association.10 In addition
we obtain data from pensioninfo which collects and composes aggregate nancial information
of companies and organizations including pension funds.11 We merged and veried data from
both sources. When there is a discrepancy between the z-scores from the two sources, we
used the z-score reported in a fund's annual report.
Our sample runs from 1998 through 2006 and covers the entire population of mandatory
industry-wide pension funds.12 Over this sample period, the number of funds varies between
10In Dutch it is called the Vereniging van Bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen (VB). See their website at www.vb.nl.
11See their website at http://www.iqinfo.com.
12According to DNB 2007 statistics there are 71 mandatory industry-wide pension funds including 7 pre-
pension funds which provide pensions for early retirement. Only mandatory funds are required to report
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Figure 1: Pension fund z-scores: 1998 - 2006
This gure reports the box plots of the z-scores of all industry-wide pension funds for each
of the years in our sample period of 1998-2006. The boxes around the median line represent
the interquartile range. The dotted lines extend to the most extreme data values within 1.5
times the interquartile range. '+'s denote further outlying observations.
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59-65 for a number of reasons. Some funds either started to exist or became mandatory after
1998, one fund merged, and two funds bought the insurance with guaranteed returns. In
the end, we have a sample of 57 funds that contain a complete data set on z-scores, and
this sample will be used for the persistence test. No funds become non-compulsory or ceases
during our sample period and thus our sample does not suer from survivorship bias. A
graphic overview of the z-scores can be found in Figure 1.
Since there is no considerable change in the relative sizes of the pension funds in our
sample, we use the value of invested assets in 2006 as a proxy for the fund size. The data is
z-scores.
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Figure 2: Size histogram of 57 pension funds in 2006
This gure draws the histogram of 57 pension funds based on their invested assets in 2006.
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obtained from all pension funds' 2006 annual reports and shown in Figure 2. The smallest
fund in the sample is e1.47 million, the largest is e208.9 billion, and the median and mean
are respectively e426 million and e7.2 billion. This reects a large size spread among Dutch
pension funds. Most funds are small- and medium-sized within e10 billion except for four
multi-billion funds.
6 Empirical results
The z-score is based on the fund-specic benchmark portfolio and reects a fund's abil-
ity in beating its own benchmark. Descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that through the
sample period the average z-score varies around 0 suggesting that the z-score measures the
15
out/underperformance. For a one-year horizon, except in the year 2002 and 2004, the aver-
age fund outperforms its benchmark. In total, the average fund does slightly better than its
benchmark.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the z-scores
Descriptive statistics for the z-scores of Dutch industry-wide pension funds over the period
of 1998-2006. (*), (**), and (***) indicate a signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. T-
statistics on the bottom line test whether the mean z-score for each year and for the pooled
sample is dierent from 0.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled
Mean 0.26** 0.27** 0.29*** 0.08 -0.89*** 0.14 -0.39*** 0.30 *** 0.30*** 0.03
Med. 0.14 0.19 0.28 -0.08 -1.00 0.04 -0.39 0.25 0.14 0.02
Maxi. 2.25 3.43 3.44 3.84 0.80 1.74 1.34 2.30 2.27 3.84
Mini. -3.07 -1.22 -1.59 -2.25 -2.91 -1.14 -1.79 -0.87 -0.58 -3.07
Std. 0.89 0.92 0.81 0.90 0.80 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.84
Skew -0.38 0.84 0.59 0.98 -0.26 0.67 0.16 1.15 1.03 0.22
Kurt 5.65 4.20 6.17 6.98 3.31 4.23 3.79 4.85 4.41 5.29
Obs. 59 59 60 61 62 63 65 64 62 555
t-stat 2.21 2.25 2.75 0.69 -8.83 1.98 -5.67 3.90 4.26 0.97
We perform a t-test to examine the statistic signicance of the above results. For a one-
year horizon, during the buoyant period of 1998 through 2000 and the recovering period of
2005 and 2006, the z-scores are positive at 5% signicance level, while in 2002 and 2004
the z-scores are negative at a 5% signicance level. When pooled together, the z-score is
not signicantly dierent from 0. Considering the possible correlation of the z-scores for
one fund over time, we also calculate the equally-weighted z-score across funds and test its
time average. We nd the average z-score over time is 0.04, and t-statistic is 0.28. In sum
we can not reject the hypothesis that industry-wide pension funds as a group over time are
not able to out-/under- perform their own benchmarks, namely that they deliver a close-to-
benchmark performance. This result agrees with the implication of non-superior selection
ability in Goyal & Wahal (2008) that fund trustees cannot time the decisions of hiring and
ring asset managers successfully.
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6.1 Performance persistence
The descriptive statistics show that the average pension fund is not able to beat its benchmark
over time. In this section we focus on the performance persistence of the pension funds in our
sample. Most studies suggest that there is no performance persistence within mutual funds.13
Within the rational market framework, this is due to the free movement of competitive capital
discussed in (Berk & Green (2004)). In the pension fund industry, however, mandates stay
with one asset manager often for more than two years. There is no competitive supply of
capital to pension asset managers, so we should expect some persistence here. To this end,
we present the results from three methods.
Following the methodology of Fama & MacBeth (1973), we rst run a cross-sectional
regression of the future z-score on the past z-score on a yearly basis as in
zi;t = at + btzi;t 1 + i;t;
during the period 1999-2006. Using standard OLS we obtain a time series of coecient
estimates (a^t and b^t). Then we perform a t-test on the average estimated coecients, shown
in Panel A of Table 3, which gives a slightly positive correlation (b^t = 0:06). It says the
past z-score positively predicts the future z-score, but not statistically signicant at a 5%
signicance level. We conclude that pension funds as a group do not show persistence in their
investment performance.
We also apply a Spearman rank correlation test for persistence, which does not require
a normal distribution from the underlying data. In this test we only use the funds with a
complete set of z-scores in all 9 years, namely a sample of 57 funds. Each year we give a
rank to each fund based on its z-score. The Spearman rank correlation coecient for two
consecutive years is then computed as
t;t 1 = 1 
6
PN
i=1 d
2
i;t;t 1
N(N2   1) ;
13Among others there are Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Bollen & Busse (2001). Some recent studies though
point out short-run persistence when using daily and monthly returns and certain performance measures such
as Bollen & Busse (2005) and Huij & Verbeek (2007).
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Table 3: Persistence tests based on regression and ranking
Panel A reports the average coecients from the cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regression
zi;t = at+ btzi;t 1+ i;t. a^t, and b^t are the time-average values of the estimated coecients a^t
and b^t from the Fama-MacBeth regressions. R2 is the time average of the exfundation power
of the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Panel B reports the Spearman rank correlation coecient
over time and a t-test on the average coecients. t-statistics are within brackets.
Panel A: Regression
a^t b^t R2
Average coecient 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.55) 0.09
Panel B: Ranking
Year '98-'99 '99-'00 '00-'01 '01-'02 '02-'03 '03-'04 '04-'05 '05-'06
t;t 1 -0.19 -0.28 -0.02 0.22 -0.29 0.15 0.15 0.44
t;t 1 0.26 (0.26)
where
PN
i=1 d
2
i;t;t 1 is the sum of squared dierences of ranks over two consecutive years for
all funds. N is the number of funds (or ranks), i.e. N=57 in our case.
For our 9-year sample, we obtain a time series of correlation coecients for 8 years. As in
the previous regression test, we apply a t-test using the average and the standard deviation
of the time series, shown in Panel B of Table 3, and nd the average coecient (0.26) is not
signicantly dierent from zero. This is consistent with our earlier result.
Table 4: Persistence test based on pension fund portfolios
This table reports the z-score in each year of a portfolio formed on the previous year's z-scores.
A sample of 57 funds with a complete set of the z-scores are used. Panels A and B shows 3-
and 5-portfolio divisions respectively.
Panel A 3 tertile portfolios
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1(Best past performer) -0.08 0.18 0.09 -0.78 0.11 -0.30 0.60 0.80
2 0.57 0.21 0.05 -1.02 -0.04 -0.35 0.22 -0.01
3(Worst past performer) 0.32 0.46 -0.09 -0.96 0.31 -0.40 0.14 0.09
Panel B 5 quintile portfolios
1(best past performer) -0.10 -0.03 -0.17 -0.63 0.16 -0.11 0.64 0.87
2 0.02 0.31 0.35 -1.01 -0.05 -0.52 0.43 0.50
3 0.59 0.48 0.05 -0.87 -0.03 -0.22 0.10 -0.07
4 0.23 -0.03 -0.03 -1.01 0.11 -0.34 0.19 -0.01
5 (worst past performer ) 0.52 0.63 -0.09 -0.99 0.42 -0.53 0.25 0.22
There might be concerns that the above results may be subject to noises from a few
individual funds. Therefore we construct 3 (and 5) portfolios based on their past performance
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Table 5: Paired sample t-tests on pension fund portfolios
The table reports the paired sample t-test for mean dierences of the z-scores of various
portfolios from Table 4. Panels A and B shows 3- and 5-portfolio division, respectively.
Panel A: Mean of paired dierence Std. Deviation t-test df Sig. (2-tailed)
Top - Mid 0.12 0.41 0.85 7 0.42
Mid - Bottom -0.03 0.20 -0.42 7 0.69
Top - Bottom 0.09 0.38 0.70 7 0.51
Panel B:
Top1 - Top2 0.08 0.36 0.59 7 0.57
Top1 - Mid3 0.08 0.54 0.39 7 0.70
Top1 - Bottom4 0.19 0.38 1.41 7 0.20
Top1 - Bottom5 0.03 0.50 0.14 7 0.89
Top2 - Mid3 0.00 0.38 0.00 7 1.00
Top2 - Bottom4 0.12 0.29 1.14 7 0.29
Top2 - Bottom5 -0.05 0.35 -0.40 7 0.70
Mid3 - Bottom4 0.12 0.23 1.44 7 0.19
Mid3 - Bottom5 -0.05 0.25 -0.56 7 0.59
Bottom4 - Bottom5 -0.17 0.27 -1.76 7 0.12
and show their future performance. Specically, every year 3 (and 5) portfolios are formed
based on their z-scores of the previous year. Then for each individual portfolio the average
z-score is computed. Repeating this for each year, we obtain a times series of z-scores for the
3 (and 5) portfolios in Table 4. If performance is persistent, the best-performing portfolios
should provide the best performance in the subsequent years again. However, our results
show some cases where the best performing portfolio from the past year provides the worst
performance of this year. For example, the best performing portfolio in 1998 is the worst in
1999. The paired sample t-tests among the 3 (and 5) portfolios reported in Table 5 shows none
of the test statistics is statistically dierent from zero. This again conrms no persistence in
fund performance over time.
In order to understand the no-persistence better, we look further into the composition of
the performance portfolios over time by applying the methodology of Fama & French (2007).
In this analysis we only use the three-portfolio division. Each column in Table 6 reports the
percentages of funds in the current portfolio that originated from the previous year's top, mid
and bottom portfolio, respectively.
We nd funds move dramatically among the top, mid and bottom portfolios. For example,
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Table 6: Migration statistics
This table reports fund migrations among portfolios sorting on performance. Every year
portfolio is formed into top, mid and bottom portfolio according to their z-scores in that
year. The column shows the composition of the current portfolio that comes from the past
top, mid or bottom portfolio respectively. In brackets are the t-statistics testing whether
the percentage is equal to 1=3 for a sample of 57 funds. With a degrees of freedom equal
to 7, critical values of 10%, 5%, 1% signicance level are 1.42, 1.90, and 3 respectively. (*)
indicates a signicant level of 10%.
Portfolio based on current performance
Portfolio based on past performance Top mid Bottom
Top 40%(0.95) 29%(-1.27) 31%(-0.43)
Mid 30%(-1.00) 29% (-1.04) 41%(2.01*)
Bottom 30%(-0.46) 42% (1.84*) 28% (-1.36)
Total 1 1 1
of the current top portfolio, 30% are funds that were in the previous year's bottom portfolio,
and another 30% come from the mid portfolio of the previous year. Of the current bottom
portfolio 31% and 41% are the funds from the top and mid portfolio in the previous year
respectively. We test the hypothesis of random migration of funds among the three portfolios.
The null hypothesis is that the migration probabilities should be all equal to 1/3. The test
statistics show that we cannot reject the hypothesis at 5% signicance level. This random
movement of funds among the three performance portfolios underlines the lack of persistence
that we found earlier.
In addition to the examination of how funds migrate between performance portfolios over
time, we also investigate the contributions to the current z-score made by the migrating funds.
Results are presented in Table 7.
In 1999, a large part ( 0:39) of the bottom portfolio's z-score ( 0:65) is contributed by
the funds that used to be in the top portfolio in the past, while the top portfolio obtains a
large chunk of its z-score (0:63 out of 1:27) from the funds in the previous bottom portfolio.
Similar patterns can be found in year 2001 and 2005, where the current bottom portfolio's
negative z-score is mostly contributed by the funds in the past top portfolio. In the years
2000 and 2003 the current top portfolio obtains a big portion of its z-score from the funds
that was in the past bottom portfolio. Such dramatic changes of performance attribution
between years again conrm our previous results that past performance does not tell us much
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Table 7: z-score decomposition of portfolios over time
Portfolios are formed on the z-scores in the same way as in Table 6. Each column decomposes
the total z-score of the current portfolio for each year between 1999-2006 into the z-scores
contributed by the previous year's portfolios. The portfolio z-score is the average z-score of
the funds included in the portfolio.
Decomposition current z-score for year 1999 through 2006
1999 Top Mid Bottom 2000 Top Mid Bottom
Total 1.27 0.20 -0.65 Total 1.06 0.28 -0.51
Top 0.25 0.05 -0.39 0.21 0.11 -0.15
Mid 0.39 0.13 -0.05 0.32 0.10 -0.21
Bottom 0.63 0.02 -0.20 0.53 0.08 -0.14
2001 2002
Total 0.90 -0.12 -0.74 Total -0.05 -0.93 -1.73
Top 0.45 -0.03 -0.32 -0.04 -0.16 -0.52
Mid 0.34 -0.04 -0.27 0.00 -0.39 -0.63
Bottom 0.12 -0.06 -0.15 -0.01 -0.38 -0.58
2003 2004
Total 0.68 0.04 -0.34 Total 0.25 -0.32 -0.94
Top 0.22 0.02 -0.16 0.10 -0.12 -0.26
Mid 0.16 -0.01 -0.17 0.04 -0.06 -0.32
Bottom 0.31 0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.14 -0.36
2005 2006
Total 0.97 0.26 -0.26 Total 0.94 0.17 -0.25
Top 0.52 0.08 -0.10 0.70 0.05 0.00
Mid 0.39 0.01 -0.08 0.15 0.02 -0.11
Bottom 0.05 0.17 -0.08 0.09 0.10 -0.13
about future performance.
6.2 Performance and fund size
The previous analysis shows that as a group the Dutch pension funds in our sample do not
show any out- or under-performance with respect to their benchmarks. It is interesting,
however, to investigate the cross-sectional dierence among funds. Ambachtsheer, Capelle &
Scheibelhut (1998) investigate 80 US and Canadian pension funds for the period 1993-1996
and nd that large fund size is an important driver for good pension performance, measured
by risk-adjusted net value added by asset mix decision and implementation. Reasons are
that large size brings economy of scale in operating cost and enables funds to support a full-
time professional management team. Following this lead we test whether pension fund size is
relevant for explaining the dierent implementation quality across Dutch pension funds. We
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Table 8: Pension fund performance regressions and size
The dependent variable is the time-average z-score of each fund. The independent variable is
the logarithm of a fund's invested assets in 2006. (***) indicates a signicant level of 1%.
Variable Coecient Std. Error t-Statistic
Constant -1.20 0.26 -4.59***
Log(assets) 0.14 0.03 4.76***
R-squared 0.54
Adj. R-squared 0.28
perform a regression of the time-average z-score on the fund's size.
The test is done on a sample of 57 funds with complete z-scores over the sample period.
Table 8 shows that size indeed matters. Size alone explains almost 28% of the variation in a
fund's average z-score. The larger funds have a higher average z-score than the smaller funds.
This nding says that larger funds are more successful in implementing their investment than
smaller funds. This result is supported by ndings in other samples. Goyal & Wahal (2008)
study the decision of hiring and ring asset managers in US pension funds. They nd that
fund size can explain the post-hiring excess returns, and suggest that large size allows pension
fund sponsors to develop expertise in selecting asset managers. Bauer et al. (2007) study the
mandate size of delegated portfolios in pension funds. They nd size is not a factor driving
the benchmark adjusted net return, but size does bring economy of scale in reducing costs
of external managers. Both these reasonings support our ndings on size, but we cannot
distinguish which is exactly at work.
We also compute the z-scores on equally weighted portfolios sorted on size, and the results
are presented in Panel A and B of Table 9. For tertile portfolios, the size eect is not obvious,
but in the quintile portfolios we see a clear dierence in the z-scores between the largest and
the smallest fund. In the range of middle-sized portfolios, there seems no clear dierence in
their z-scores. This says that the top 20% of the funds ranked on size persistently outperform
the bottom 20%. As Figure 2 suggests that most funds are small and medium-sized except a
few huge funds, we thus form 4 size portfolios in Panel C into the categories of "smaller than
e0.1 billion", "between e0.1 billion and e1 billion", "between e1 billion and e10 billion", and
"larger than e10 billion".14 Respectively they contains 8, 27, 18 and 4 funds. We apply paired
14Our sample of pension funds contains two very large funds, ABP and PGGM with asset sizes of e208
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Table 9: Average z-score of size portfolios over time
Panel A and B are 3 and 5 equally weighted portfolios formed on the fund size in 2006. Panel
C are 4 portfolios based on some specic size breakpoints, the number of funds are indicated
in brackets. The tables reports the equally-weighted z-score for each portfolio over time.
The sample includes 57 funds that have the complete z-scores over the whole sample period
1998-2006.
Panel A 3 size (tertile) portfolios
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 (largest fund) 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.09 -0.46 0.08 -0.20 0.64 0.51
2 0.48 0.09 0.48 -0.17 -0.83 0.19 -0.37 0.14 0.25
3(smallest fund) 0.06 0.43 0.09 0.13 -1.41 0.11 -0.45 0.18 0.09
Panel B 5 size (quintile) portfolios
1(largest) 0.49 0.51 0.13 0.10 -0.42 0.19 -0.11 0.68 0.65
2 0.43 -0.04 0.22 0.02 -0.48 -0.07 -0.38 0.46 0.39
3 0.22 0.22 0.52 -0.22 -0.96 0.20 -0.36 0.08 0.21
4 0.15 0.09 0.55 0.17 -1.43 0.24 -0.62 0.10 -0.04
5(smallest) 0.10 0.60 -0.01 -0.02 -1.31 0.08 -0.26 0.25 0.17
Panel C 4 size (quartile) portfolios
>e10 bln (4) 0.31 1.45 0.57 -0.34 -0.18 0.49 0.29 0.92 1.28
e1-e10bln(18) 0.42 -0.03 0.08 0.22 -0.54 -0.02 -0.30 0.49 0.33
e0.1-e1bln (27) 0.17 0.28 0.43 -0.11 -1.10 0.16 -0.54 0.15 0.15
<e0.1bln (8) 0.37 0.34 0.07 0.15 -1.44 0.17 -0.08 0.22 0.17
sample t-tests to the largest and the smallest portfolio in Table 10. We nd that the dierence
in the z-scores between the largest and the smallest size portfolios is statistically signicant
no matter how many portfolios are formed. To relieve the concern over the power of the t-test
in this small sample, we also perform the Wilcoxon signed ranks test that is a nonparametric
test suitable for small samples. The test results maintain the original conclusion. Our results
are consistent with the ndings on US and Canadian pension funds that size is a driver
for performance. Large funds implement their investments better than small funds. Due
to the data limitation, we cannot explain what causes this better performance. Possible
explanation could be negotiation power in lower costs, reputation eect, better monitoring of
asset managers, or more expertise in selecting superior asset managers.
billion and e81 billion respectively in 2006. Later on we also form size portfolios from a sample after removing
these two biggest funds and our results remain robust.
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Table 10: Paired sample t-tests of z-scores on size portfolios
The table reports the paired sample t-test for the z-score dierence between the top portfolio
and the bottom portfolio in the respective 3 (tertile), 5 (quintile) and 4 (quartile) portfolio
divisions. Portfolios are formed on size, which is measured by the investment amount in 2006.
With a degrees of freedom equal to 8, critical values of 10%, 5%, 1% signicance level are
1.40, 1.86, and 2.90, respectively. (*)(**)(***) indicates a signicant level at 10%, 5% and
1%.
Mean of paired dierence Std. dev. t-test df Sig. (2-tailed)
3-portfolio division 0.26 0.33 2.34** 8 0.05
5-portfolio division 0.29 0.29 3.00*** 8 0.02
4-portfolio division 0.53 0.58 2.76** 8 0.03
7 Conclusions
One of the main tasks of pension fund trustees is to design an investment strategy that is
consistent with the short and long term goals of the fund. The strategic asset allocation
decision typically delivers the major part of the investment return, whereas operational and
tactical allocation decisions determine excess returns from the strategic benchmarks. Our
paper focuses on the eectiveness of the second decision in terms of properly selecting asset
managers and monitoring the investment process. Dutch mandatory industry-wide pension
funds are obliged to publish a z-score to show their net-of-fees investment performance relative
to a priori self-selected benchmarks. These scores reect the implementation quality of the
strategic asset allocation. After a study of the z-scores on a comprehensive and unique data
set of industry-wide pension funds in the Netherlands, we nd no outperformance and no per-
formance persistence. We conclude that pension funds on average cannot generate investment
returns above their benchmarks. It means that pension funds on average do not add value in
selecting and monitoring internal and/or external asset managers. However, we do nd that
large funds perform consistently better than small funds. This might be attributed to factors
like economy of scale in costs, expertise in asset manager selection, or eective monitoring
of asset managers. More detailed data is needed to distinguish among these factors to nd
the driving force of this outperformance. Nevertheless, our results corroborate the empirical
trend that smaller pension funds either merge, or are being acquired by bigger funds in order
to improve their investment performance.
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